This paper presents a historical review of a series of pivotal FCC decisions that helped shape today's communications landscape. These decisions generally involve the appearance of a new technology, communications device, or service. In many cases, they involve spectrum allocation or usage. Policymakers no doubt will draw their own conclusions, and may even disagree, about the lessons to be learned from studying the past decisions.
Introduction
This is a historical review of a series of pivotal decisions that helped shape today's communications landscape, including decisions by the FCC about the following: establishing commercial radio (by the Federal Radio Commission) in 1928; spectrum allocations and color standards for over-the air-television in 1945 and 1952; regulating cable television in 1966 and the early 1970s; authorizing customers in 1968 to attach equipment to their telephone lines; promoting direct broadcast satellites as a competitive alternative to cable television in 1982; letting the market decide the appropriate standards for digital cell phones in 1992; and adopting technical standards for high-definition and digital television in 1996 and 1997.
Overall, these decisions have been among the most critical the Commission has faced, generally involving the appearance of a new technology, communications device, or service. In many cases, the decisions involve spectrum allocation or usage. These are "transformative" decisions in the sense that they required the Commission to decide whether to "adopt, with minor revisions, the same legal and regulatory framework and mode of organization, or fundamentally transform them?" 1 Some of the decisions are sufficiently far back in the past that policymakers may not be fully aware or have forgotten what was decided. In addition, these particular historical decisions happen also to shed light on topical issues. The Commission's choices about radio in the 1920s and television in the 1950s have their echoes in current debates about media concentration, diversity, and localism. Competing demands for scarce spectrum resonate from the earliest days to the present. The Carterfone decision can be seen as a precursor to open Internet principles. All these are reasons to study this history, even though policymakers no doubt will draw their own conclusions, and may even disagree, about the lessons to be learned from studying the past decisions.
From an academic perspective, too, these case studies offer an opportunity to examine a commonly-asserted view that regulatory policies throughout the economy underwent a major change in the 1970s, from protecting incumbents to promoting competition.
2 Is that general view reflected in FCC policies? Two case studies are relevant on this point: (1) the Commission's efforts to protect incumbents are shown in the cable industry case study; and (2) the Commission's efforts to promote entry by a new entrant are explored in the DBS study.
Finally, the case studies on digital cell phones and high-definition TV examine the Commission's role in setting technical standards, as well as the trade policy impact of these Commission decisions. Reform (2007) ("A wave of deregulation hit aviation, trucking, and telecommunications in the mid-1970s, stimulated by an intellectually powerful and persuasive body of writings from experts in influential economics departments, law schools and think tanks.") at 2.
Radio (1928)
Commercial broadcasting began in 1920, when Westinghouse opened station KDKA and broadcast the November 2 election results. 3 For much of the rest of the decade, however, broadcasting was not a profitable operation and most broadcasters were not professional broadcasters, as we know them today. 4 Although large corporations like RCA, GE, AT&T, and Westinghouse dominated the manufacturing of radio sets and other aspects of the radio industry, by far the vast majority of broadcasters in the early 1920s were non-commercial entities: colleges and universities, labor unions, and civic organizations. Only 4.3% of all stations in 1926 were "commercial broadcasters." 5 Chaos in the airwaves FRC Commissioner Orestes Caldwell explained in a June 1927 speech why the FRC needed to step in and assert control over the airwaves:
"Proper separation between established stations was destroyed by other stations coming in and camping in the middle of any open spaces they could find, each interloper thus impairing reception of three stations-his own and two others. Instead of the necessary 50 kilocycle separation between stations in the same community, the condition soon developed where separations of 20 and 10 kilocycles, and even 8, 5, and 2, kilocycles existed. Under such separations, of course, stations were soon wildly blanketing each other and distracted listeners were assailed with scrambled programs." Federal Radio Commission, First Annual Report, 1927, pp. 10-11. A major concern for industry leaders and policymakers was making broadcasters economically self-sufficient. In 1924, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, solicited major foundations to subsidize educational programming and proposed a 2% tax on sales of radio sets to "pay for
What did the FRC do?
The Federal Radio Commission created a new structure favoring commercial broadcasting. Specifically, the FRC:
--adopted a series of orders widening the broadcast band to the entire spectrum between 550 kHz to 1500 kHz and removing portable stations from the air; 9 --allocated 40 nationwide high powered (generally 25,000-50,000 watts) "clear channels" on which only one station operated at nighttime, plus other regional and local channels; 10 --set a preference for commercial use over stations representing religious, political, social, and economic viewpoints.
11

The FRC's rationale for its actions
The main stated reason for regulating spectrum use was to bring order to the chaotic situation where stations operated without licenses and interference was a major concern.
12 Though national networks could have been created by interconnecting (using telephone lines) a chain of lower-power local stations, 9 Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned at 143. 10 Federal Radio Commission, General Order 40, First Annual Report (1928) at 48-50. 11 In re Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., Federal Radio Commission, Third Annual Report (1929) at [32] [33] [34] [35] Robert McChesney, Telecommunications, Mass Media, For a different viewpoint, arguing that the private sector would have resolved interference issues though private arrangements with minimal governmental action, see John Berresford, "How Government Can Bring New Communications to All Americans: Six Lessons of History," Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University (2004) at 24-28. Though interesting, this argument is ultimately unpersuasive because the private arrangements were too few and far between to solve a major nationwide problem. the FCC at that time favored networks consisting of high power, 'clear channels' that had nationwide coverage at nighttime. 13 Commercial broadcasters pushed for national radio networks which they saw as "the only plan" for successfully financing radio broadcasting because it would permit the development of national advertising. 14 The FRC initially steered away from endorsing these proposals to create a national advertiser-financed broadcasting system. The FRC's chief engineer described the channel allocation plan as entirely an engineering matter: "The reason for this is purely physical fact."
15 Indeed, the FRC stated in 1928 that its allocation plan was not intended for the primary benefit of advertisers.
16 By 1929, however, after having created 40 national clear channels and other regional high powered stations that depended on advertiser financing, the FRC acknowledged that the system it had created would need to be financed by 13 Nationwide coverge at nighttime is possible for AM radio stations due to a phenomenon called "skywave" propagation. To prevent massive interference, the small number of clear channel stations was granted nighttime exclusivity. Since 1980, however, The FRC also said it was driven by spectrum scarcity to favor "general purpose" commercial stations over the non-profit ("propaganda") stations. In regard to "propaganda" stations, the FRC stated:
"There is not room in the broadcast band for every school of thought, religious, political, social, and economic, each to have its separate broadcasting station, its mouthpiece in the ether."
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In practice, the FRC issued licenses to wellfinanced commercial stations rather than to non-commercial stations.
19
Impact of the decision: the long view * The FRC's decisions brought an end to the chaos in the airwaves that had existed in the mid-1920s and set the structure of the broadcasting industry for decades. (1945, 1952) In the postwar period, television stations were on the air in only six cities (New York, Washington, Schenectady, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles) and broadcasting only a few hours a day.
Broadcast Television
Stakeholders
There were two competitors for VHF channels: FM radio (esp. radio pioneer Edwin Armstrong) wanted to keep and expand on its 55 channels in the 42-50 MHz band; commercial TV networks (esp. RCA) wanted the VHF channels for television.
RCA, as the leading provider of black and white TV sets and TV programming, also favored continuing TV in black and white on 6 MHz standard channels but CBS, the disruptive new entrant, urged delaying TV allocations until after deciding on color and high-definition standards.
Demand grew quickly, so that by 1948 there were 34 stations in 21 cities, and over a million TV sets. 26 Television had arrived, and the FCC faced a series of pivotal decisions that helped to shape its future. They involved resolving competing claims for spectrum for TV and FM radio; whether to use the VHF or UHF bands; adopting a color TV standard, and deciding whether to establish educational TV (later known as "public television"). The FCC's options were:
i. Permit FM radio to retain its VHF channels and assign TV channels in the UHF band (which could accommodate the wider 16 MHz channels CBS requested) after the new technical standards were set; or Move FM radio to an upper part of the VHF band and allocate TV channels in the VHF band, delaying a decision on color TV, highdefinition TV and UHF allocations for TV.
ii. In interpreting section 307(b) of the Communications Act, which required the FCC to distribute licenses on a "fair, efficient, and equitable" basis to all States and localities, 27 choose between assigning licenses on a local or regional basis.
iii. Allocate space for educational TV [ETV] in the VHF or UHF bands or, alternatively, 26 Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned, at 251, 278. The FCC allocated 19 VHF channels in 1937 for experimental TV and 18 VHF channels in 1941 for commercial TV (though most of the channels were used by the military during the war). 27 Sixth in Pike and Fisher, Radio Regulation, Vol. 1, Part 3, leave it to commercial broadcasters to produce educational content.
iv. Choose between the color standard proposed by CBS or RCA.
What did the FCC do?
--In 1945, the FCC moved FM radio up the VHF band, from 42-50 MHz to 88-108 MHz (1945); 28 --At the same time, the FCC also rejected proposals for wideband, high-definition color TV on the UHF band and instead allocated 12 channels (2 to 13) in the VHF band for TV, with channels 2-6 at 54 MHz to 88 MHz, and channels 7-13 at 174 MHz to 216 MHz.; 29 --In 1948, with 50 stations on the air, and an additional 50 construction permits issued, the FCC instituted a "freeze" on licenses.
30
--In 1952, the FCC added 70 UHF channels (14 to 83) for commercial and noncommercial TV, intending the VHF and 28 Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned, [249] [250] [251] [252] [253] . 29 Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned, 251. 30 Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned, [319] [320] [321] FCC Staff Working Paper UHF stations to "constitute an integral part of a single, nationwide television service"; 31 --The FCC also assigned local, not regional or national TV licenses; 32 --Reserved one VHF channel for educational broadcasting in any city with more than 3 VHF channels (unless all the VHF channels had already been assigned), and one UHF channel in other cities. 33 Initially, the FCC picked the CBS color standard (1950) but later reversed itself and adopted the NTSC standard developed by RCA (1953) .
34
The FCC's rationale for its actions FM radio v. TV: Initially, in 1940, the FCC, under new Chairman James Lawrence Fly, favored FM, primarily to limit the dominant power of radio giants, RCA and NBC. Thus, the FCC transferred a TV channel (44 to 50 MHz) to FM radio, giving FM a total of 40 channels in which to expand. 35 However, after Fly left office in 1944, FM lost ground. Faced with competing demands for the same spectrum band, the FCC picked TV over FM radio, and justified its decision in part on an engineering analysis (later alleged to be flawed) predicting that FM radio would experience interference from the sunspot 31 Television Allocations, Sixth Report & Order, at ¶ ¶ 22-25, 197 in Pike and Fisher, Radio Regulation, Vol. 1, Part 3, at 91:607-608, 664 (1952 44 Sterling, and Kittross, Stay Tuned, at 328; Sixth R& O at ¶ 38, in Pike and Fisher, Radio Regulation, Vol. 1, Part 3, at 91:612-91:613 (1952) . 45 Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned, [322] [323] [324] Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, [214] [215] [216] [217] [218] . David Sarnoff, RCA's chief, acknowledged after a test that RCA's color was not that good: "The monkeys were green, the bananas were blue, and everyone had a good laugh." Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, at 215 . 46 Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, [215] [216] .
Impact of the decisions: the long view
FM radio: Though FM radio gained by getting more channels, the creator of FM radio, Edwin Armstrong, lost, as the FCC decision rendered obsolete 400,000-500,000 radio sets. 47 In 1941 "Congress created the present scheme in order to promote specific policies and specific kinds of programs. A system of locally based stations was deemed necessary to ensure that broadcasting would be attentive to the specific needs and interests of each local community. It was also considered a guarantee to local groups and leaders that they would have adequate opportunity for expression. Ultimately, our broadcasting system is premised on concern that the very identity of states and cities might be destroyed by a mass communications system with an exclusively national focus. Instead, because licenses were issued for local stations, a different result followed: "The local station concept, on the other hand, would reduce the power of each station, permitting many more communities to have their own station but reducing the number of channels any given viewer would receive."
56
As a result of favoring local stations over regional stations, only the "Big 3" national networks developed in the U.S., until 1987, 57 when a fourth (Fox) was added. "the fact remains that almost all of the programming broadcast over the local stations has a national focus. The network affiliates, which constitute the vast majority of VHF stations, rely on the networks for 82 percent of their prime-time programming. Of the remaining 18 percent, a high proportion is devoted to non-network films and other programming. Outside of prime time, the reliance is less-particularly for affiliates of ABC, which offers less daytime network programming-but the pattern is much the same. Few local programs other than local news and weather and sports are offered." 60 Clearly, the lack of local programming was a concern for Congress and the FCC, who expected a much more extensive role for local broadcasting than turned out to be the case. [See box]
Cable Television (1966, 1970s)
From its modest beginnings around 1950, cable TV grew rapidly as an alternative distribution mechanism to broadcast TV.
61
In the 1950s, new cable systems were introduced at an annual rate of 24.9 percent and subscriber growth was about 40 percent annually. In 1959, the FCC adopted a policy supporting the growth of cable TV, except in the extreme case in which a broadcaster could show that "it was the only local broadcast service whose existence was threatened."
62 By 1966, more than 1 million homes out of 60 million received cable, and more than 1,200 systems were operating.
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By then, the FCC began to change its view that cable was no longer a threat to broadcasting.
What did the FCC do?
1966: The FCC decided to limit and regulate the manner in which CATV competes with the basic off-air television broadcast service. 64 y the 65 Most significantly, the FCC broadened the scope of its concern from markets in which the broadcaster was the only TV station to the top 100 markets. 1972: The FCC adopted complex rules (described by two scholars as "baroque"): 67 * "Must carry" was still required; * The number of distant signals that could be imported (e.g., 3 networks, 3 independents) varied depending on the stations market size (top 50, 50-100, smaller markets); * Cable operators could not "leapfrog" nearby stations in favor of large-market independent stations; * Syndicated network programming on local stations was protected from competition by identical programming on imported signals; * Systems with 3,500 or more subscribers had to originate some of their own programming; * Channels had to be set aside for public, educational, and government use; * Channel capacity had to be added if all channels were in use for more than 80 percent of the time in any three hour period for six weeks.
68 From 1974 From -1978 The FCC's rationale for its actions The FCC's actions in 1966 were designed to prevent "unfair" competition by cable systems and to foreclose any "adverse impact" on broadcasting as a result of cable's growth. 71 The purpose of extending these rules to the top 100 markets was to protect UHF broadcasters, who were still struggling to gain a foothold despite the FCC's efforts since the 1950s to promote broadcasting in the UHF band.
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The complex 1972 rules were the result of a compromise between the broadcasters and cable operators that was defended by the FCC as being in the public interest because they protected local broadcasting while allowing some growth for cable. 73 70 Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned, at 417-418; Crawford, "Cable Regulation in the Satellite Era," at 6-11. 71 Besen et al, 
Carterfone (1968)
In the 1940's and 1950's, the FCC had repeatedly supported prohibitions against any "foreign attachments," e.g., the Jordaphone (a prototype of today's answering machine) and the Hush-A-Phone (a small plastic device snapped onto the mouthpiece to provide privacy in crowded office environments). 82 The Court of Appeals reversed the FCC's Hush-A-Phone decision, stating: "The mere fact that the telephone companies can provide a rival device would seem a poor reason for disregarding Hush-A-Phone's value in assuring a quiet line. Cir. 1956 ). 84 The device in question was the Carterfone, described by the FCC as follows:
"The Carterfone is designed to be connected to a two-way radio at the base station serving a mobile radio system. When callers on the radio and on the telephone are both in contact with the base station operator, the handset of the operator's telephone is placed on a cradle in the Carterfone device. A voice control circuit in the Carterfone automatically switches on the radio transmitter when the telephone caller is speaking; when he stops speaking, the radio returns to a receiving condition. A separate speaker is attached to the Carterfone to allow the base station operator to monitor the conversation, adjust the voice volume, and hang up his telephone when the conversation has ended."
Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll
Telephone Prices, 13 FCC Rcd 420, recon. denied, 14 FCC 2d 571, 572 (1968) .
1966, Carter Electronics had produced 4500 of these devices and sold 3500 devices to dealers. AT&T filed tariffs prohibiting their use.
What did the FCC do?
In 1968, the FCC struck down AT&T's tariff and ordered all carriers to file new tariffs permitting use of devices not made by the phone companies. 85 The FCC found that AT&T's tariff was unreasonable because it would have prohibited the Carterfone attachment whether or not it harmed the telephone system: "the vice of the present tariff … is that it prohibits the use of harmless as well as harmful devices."
86
The FCC also found that the tariff was discriminatory because it permitted customers to attach equipment similar to the Carterfone provided that the equipment was manufactured by AT&T.
87
On reconsideration, the FCC set some limits, insisting that it was not "opening the door to customer ownership of telephone handsets."
88
Impact of the decision: the long view
Although the FCC's decision allowed users to connect equipment to the telephone line, AT&T filed a revised tariff that also permitted the use of privately supplied telephones and other telephone equipment. As a former FCC Commissioner later noted: Broadcasters (e.g., NBC, the Association of Maximum Service Television) and several public interest groups (e.g., the United Church of Christ), and others (e.g., the American Newspaper Publishers Association, the American Petroleum Institute, the Association of American Railroads) opposed the applications.
Options
i. Deny the application on the grounds that the benefits to the public do not justify using the spectrum and orbital slots for DBS;
ii. Permit use of the orbital slots and spectrum to provide broadcast video to unserved rural areas;
iii. Allocate only a portion of the 500 MHz for DBS while retaining the balance for private microwave uses; iv. Allocate the entire 500 MHz for DBS and grant the applications because DBS potentially had a unique capability to provide service to rural and other unserved areas; would increase competition and diversity by offering additional programming to the public; could introduce new video services such as high-definition TV; and would promote the satellite communications industry.
v. Impose a traditional broadcast regulatory framework for DBS or adopt minimal regulation. 95 Inquiry into the Development of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 FCC 2d 676 (1982) at ¶ ¶ 2-5.
What did the FCC do?
The FCC authorized DBS service, amended the Table of Frequency Allocations to permit DBS downlink operations in the 12.2-12.7 GHz band and uplink operations in the 17.3-17.8 GHz band, and adopted rules to prevent harmful interference to DBS operators from terrestrial licensees in the 12 GHz band.
96
The FCC also decided to adopt a "flexible regulatory approach" to DBS systems, permitting DBS providers to choose to operate either as broadcasters or common carriers or both (i.e., as a broadcaster on some channels and a common carrier on others) and declined to impose ownership restrictions or access requirements. 
The FCC's rationale for its actions
DBS' Shaky Start
None of the applicants survived (at least until one or two resurfaced in the 1990s), sunk by the high cost of launching satellites (estimated at $700 million in the first year) and the lack of programming that differentiated DBS from on-air television. The FCC concluded that DBS would give high-quality television service to as many as 11 million people in rural areas who in 1981 had no on-air reception or got fewer than 3 channels and who would be willing to pay as much as 5 percent of their income for this service.
98
The FCC also determined that viewers in urban areas would highly value the additional options for television viewing that DBS could provide. 99 Overall, the FCC concluded that the benefits of DBS far outweighed any adverse impact DBS would have on local broadcasting, and would also constitute efficient spectrum utilization. 
Impact of the decision: the long view
Although the FCC "moved with the regulatory speed of light" in approving this new service, the market was slow to follow. 101 (See box, left) DBS, thus, at least initially was seen as a major flop: "the 1983-84 disaster of DBS was on such a scale as to somewhat depress the entire business of space satellites."
102
Cable companies, fearing the threat from DBS, denied emerging DBS operators like DirecTV access to programming, and also formed their own DBS operator (Primestar), which led to an antitrust lawsuit filed by the New York Attorney General.
103
Congress then stepped in and helped DBS by enacting the Satellite Home Viewer Act in 1988 which allows satellite carriers to deliver broadcast programming to satellite viewers who were unable to receive broadcast programming ("unserved households"). 104 In 1992, Congress went further and enacted the "program access" requirements (section 628), which essentially enabled DBS to get the right to offer cable content to its viewers on nondiscriminatory terms. 105 An ongoing issue for regulators is whether (or when) these "program access" rules should be ended. If the rules are continued too long, there is a danger of harm to the competitive process. As Shapiro and Varian have stated: "Regulations like these, which control and circumscribe the vertical relationships between those who produce content and distribute it, are increasingly out of place as the creation of content and distribution of information become more and more competitive….
Hopefully, the monopoly power enjoyed by cable operators will also erode as broadcast satellite becomes a stronger force and as telephone companies enter into multichannel video distribution. In this setting, regulations on vertical relationships in the information sector may well serve to benefit certain special interests rather then the public interest." iii. Mandate a standard in a rulemaking.
What did the FCC do?
Although the FCC had set the AMPS standard for analog cellular in 1979, by the mid-1980s the FCC favored a more flexible approach.
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Thus, the FCC declined in 1988 to adopt a single standard; instead letting market forces determine which standard to adopt. 113 In its 1988 decision, the FCC stated:
"We believe it would be premature for the Commission to intervene in the standard setting process. Industry is in a better position to evaluate the technical advantages and disadvantages of the various advanced cellular technologies and develop approaches to compatibility."
114
The FCC also did not want to engage in the delays that may have occurred in a rulemaking, and believed that industry was best suited for developing a standard. 127 The FCC also noted that mobile penetration in Europe was very high "due in part to greater use of prepaid service plans and ownership of multiple devices or subscriber identity module ("SIM") cards."
128 The SIM option was included in the GSM standard adopted by European regulators but is not freely available to most U.S. consumers. * CDMA may also have technical advantages over GSM, such as increased efficiency (meaning that the carrier can serve more subscribers), lower power requirements, and the need for fewer cell towers (because less cell-to-cell coordination is needed by operators). 
High Definition and Digital Television (1987-1997)
At the outset, it is worth noting the differences between high-definition television and digital television. HDTV refers to a level of picture quality. Digital television (DTV) refers to a type of transmission. HDTV can be analog or digital and DTV can be high-definition or standard definition. Broadcasters can send HDTV or DTV signals, and so can cable and satellite operators.
131
In terms of policy, too, there are several issues at play. "Repacking" is the freeing up spectrum from one use and designating it for a different use, e.g., broadcast to wireless services. "Multicasting" enables broadcasters to choose to use the available spectrum to offer multiple viewing channels rather than a single HD channel.
Over a period of several years, the FCC became the battleground for a major, highstakes showdown involving spectrum, technical standards, and global trade.
Stakeholders
In the late 1980s, land mobile operators had almost persuaded the FCC to reallocate unused broadcast spectrum for law enforcement and other purposes, but broadcasters fought to preserve their stake in the spectrum by arguing the spectrum was needed to provide HDTV. The standards battle pitted four main teams of engineers and innovators: (1) NHK, the Japanese public broadcasting company; (2) Zenith and AT&T; (3) General Instrument and MIT; and (4) Philips, Sarnoff Research Labs, NBC and Thomson, working together as the Advanced Television Research Consortium. In May 1993, NHK, which had proposed the only non-digital HDTV system, dropped out, and the remaining 3 teams formed a "Grand Alliance" in which they agreed to merge their technologies and engage in cross-licensing.
134
Computer companies and movie studios, also joined the standards battle, insisting that any HDTV standard should include a progressive scanning industry specification (rather than interlacing), in order to facilitate convergence between the television and personal computer industries.
135
The NAB opposed any requirement that broadcasters must use the second channel for HDTV, but the Big 3 networks and some programmers supported requiring a minimum amount of HDTV programming. Mandate HDTV? i. Require all broadcasters to offer HDTV programming on the second channel.
ii. Permit broadcasters to decide whether and how much HDTV to offer, while requiring they offer digital TV.
What did the FCC do?
Allocating spectrum: The FCC backed off from proposals to allocate unused broadcast spectrum for Land Mobile, after being persuaded by broadcasters they needed the spectrum for HDTV. R&O, 12 FCC Rcd 12809 (1997) at 12826-12827.
The FCC's rationale for its actions
Allocations: The FCC backed away from requiring broadcasters to share the spectrum with land mobile operators after concluding that broadcasters may need the spectrum for HDTV, which was emerging as a trade war issue for the US against perceived Japanese dominance.
146 There was strong congressional support for HDTV and the broadcasters' position. 
Lessons Learned
"As so often had been the case in communications, the path of development was not easily diverted from familiar channels….Change would come, but it would come slowly. Even today much of the system of power established by the early decisions remains with us-and the media those decisions helped to create is now ubiquitous and inescapable."
Starr, The Creation of the Media, at 384 (emphasis added).
The following is a summary of the main lessons learned from a review of the FCC decisions discussed in the previous sections:
Radio: The charm of early radio was that "experimentation, spontaneity and content aimed at small audiences were common."
157
The FRC disfavored this type of content as narrowly-focused propaganda, and instead adopted rules that resulted in the growth of commercial radio financed by advertising revenues. Although commercial radio produced a Golden Age of programming in the late 1930s, 158 the question remains whether the FRC's decision to favor corporate-sponsored networks-rather than the multiplicity of diverse non-commercial stations--best served the public interest. The FRC performed a valuable service by helping to create commercial networks but did so at the cost of achieving diversity. Yet, today, there is a strong push to see just such diversity in broadcast programming on radio and television. 159 157 Berresford, "How Government Can Bring New Communications to All Americans," at 14 (noting that early radio content was "talk, ethnic nationality hours, labor news, church news, and vaudeville-type musical entertainment by hometown, often ethnic talent"). 158 Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned, [181] [182] [183] [184] [185] [186] [187] [188] [189] [190] [191] [192] [193] [194] [195] [196] [197] [198] [199] [200] Also, as we will see, the focus on developing national networks for radio contrasts with the focus on achieving localism for broadcast television. Here, too, there are mixed results. As Starr notes, while the FRC did succeed in creating national radio networks, there was an implicit tradeoff: "more equal access to listening meant more concentrated control of broadcasting." 160 Broadcast Television: Unlike the decisions concerning radio, the FCC's decisions on broadcast television did not as easily achieve the desired results. For example, although FM radio gained more channels in the 1945 allocations, the number of stations shrank and the creator of FM radio, Edwin Armstrong, lost, as the FCC decision rendered obsolete 400,000-500,000 radio sets. FM radio did not start to grow again until the 1960s.
Additionally, though the FCC approved CBS' color standard in 1950, the company did not make many sets because the sets were unable to receive black and white transmissions which consumers continued to want. As late as 1963, only 3% of households had color sets. Yet, it is not just the decisions concerning FM radio or color TV but the entire package of decisions concerning broadcast television that is justly criticized. Overall, the result for most Americans was less choice: fewer on-air stations and confusion resulting from the failures of the FCC's intermixture policy.
With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that a better outcome could have been achieved by delaying the 1945 allocation decision until enough information was available to set the color standard (as CBS had urged), and later assigning channels in the UHF and Democracy") and ch. 10 ("Low Power to the People"). 160 This would have enabled FM radio to continue its growth without a decades-long interruption, produced better quality color TV (including in higher definition), and avoided the engineering hassles and delay that lasted through the 1950s to determine whether communities should receive TV broadcasts from VHF or UHF stations or some mixture of the two.
In addition, the Commission may have missed an opportunity to create 6-7 national TV channels, rather than the 3-4 that finally emerged. An increase in the number of channels would likely have meant more program diversity. 163 As noted with regard to radio, national licenses may also have resulted in greater ownership concentration. These tradeoffs present complex policy choices that warrant further study.
Cable Television:
In the early 1960s, cable TV showed promise as an alternative distribution mechanism to broadcast TV. In the preceding decade, new cable systems were introduced at an annual rate of 24.9 percent and subscriber growth was about 40 percent annually. More than 1 million homes out of 60 million received cable, and 161 See e.g., Slotten, Radio and Television Regulation, at 229 ("Without falling into the fallacy of counterfactual history, we can conclude that CBS' system might have been successful had it received more support from industry and the FCC. It probably stood the best chance of success in 1947, before monochrome television became completely entrenched."). 162 Slotten, Radio and Television Regulation, at 132 (quoting the President of Zenith Radio). This presumes that the concerns about interference could have been resolved. Supra, p.8, n.36. 163 Noll et al, Economic Aspects of Television Regulation, at 101. ("[A] n increase in the number of channels … would enable minority tastes to be met with less loss of conventional fare."). Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned, at 468. See generally, Daniel Brenner et al, Cable Television and Other Nonbroadcast Video: Law and Policy (2004) at 2-10 to 2-22 (discussing the 1992 Cable Act and its precedents). 166 Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned, at 417-418; Crawford, "Cable Regulation in the Satellite Era," at 6-11.
When Should the FCC Set Technical Standards?
Should the FCC let carriers decide which standard to adopt (as it did for digital cellular) or mandate the standard (as it did by approving the ATSC standard proposed by industry for HDTV)? Which is a "better" course of action?
There is no easy answer. The "market" approach may be appropriate for telecommunications issues as long as firms are required to interconnect. In such a case, there is no "collective action" problem, i.e., firms are able to take the risk of adopting a standard on their own without needing other firms to adopt the same standard.
Government action may have been necessary for HDTV, however, because it is unlikely that the multiple players with divergent interests (e.g., broadcasters, cable and satellite operators, content providers, computer companies, equipment manufacturers) would have been able to agree on a single standard (the "collective action" problem).
Failure to set a standard may result in a standards war that may prevent industry from making a successful transition to a new technology. But, there is also a risk that regulators may lack the technical expertise to pick the best standard or may be better off letting the market assess risks. In each case, there are tradeoffs that must be assessed and judgments made.
The bottom line: there are "no neat formulas" for deciding when governmental intervention is appropriate.
See generally, Nuechterlein and Weiser, Digital Crossroads at 392-395. having a choice of telephone handsets for many years, because it took the FCC another 7 years to develop the Part 68 rules and even longer for the "separate subsidiaries" requirement that led to the growth of a competitive market for telephone handsets and other equipment.
In addition, without Carterfone, the result may have been an Internet that would have taken much longer to develop because telephone users were prohibited from attaching devices to their telephone. Instead, the decision led to rules permitting modems for Internet access over phone lines-in addition to its significant pre-Internet contribution towards creating a robust and competitive data communications market.
Direct-Broadcast Satellite (DBS):
The DBS story offers a clear example of effective governmental action to encourage entry into monopoly markets by awarding government franchises to new entrants. 167 However, as demonstrated by the initial failure of DBS operators in the years immediately following the franchise awards, additional help was needed: access to the programming carried by cable operators. DBS, though authorized in 1982, reemerged as a commercial service only in 1994, six years after Congress passed program access legislation.
With the benefit of ongoing regulatory and legislative support, the result is a service that now has 25-30 million subscribers and has emerged as a strong competitor in the market for video services.
Digital cell phones:
The FCC did not adopt any transmission standards but let carriers decide which standard to adopt. In the U.S. that resulted in three different standards: TDMA, GSM, and CDMA. The "market" approach was faulted by those who argued the U.S. lost ground to Europe, which mandated GSM as the standard for digital cellular. Yet, for both consumers and U.S. firms, the FCC's decision to give carriers the flexibility to develop their own standards may turn out to be a good decision in the long run.
Overall, American consumers are benefiting from lower prices and greater usage, so it may mean little whether the U.S. should have mandated a standard or let the market set it. European consumers, however, have an advantage in being able to use SIM cards to switch carriers to obtain the best service. The SIM option was included in the GSM standard adopted by European regulators but is not freely available to most U.S. consumers.
From a trade perspective, because this is not a winner-take-all market, U.S. companies, as well as those from Europe, have been able to achieve significant gains.
High Definition (HDTV) and Digital Television (DTV):
The race to develop HDTV produced a major technological breakthrough (i.e., digitization of HDTV) and consumer gains such as a better quality television picture. Overall, these developments, along with a series of later decisions by the FCC, helped speed up the transition to digital TV.
With the fundamental shift to an all-digital system, the FCC was also able, in effect, to "have its cake and eat it, too," i.e., permit broadcasters to use the spectrum for HDTV and allocate spectrum for wireless services. The additional spectrum enabled the FCC to at least in part meet the growing demand (continuing even today) for spectrum to offer advanced wireless services, such as high speed access to the Internet.
However, the trade benefits of adopting an ATSC standard are not clear. Policymakers were initially motivated to focus on the value of HDTV by the possibility of losing to Japan in a trade war. Today, after the FCC did its part by adopting the ATSC standard, European and Japanese companies are among the world's leading manufacturers of HDTV sets. It is perhaps ironic that although the US "won" the HDTV standards war, American companies gained little: they only get royalty fees while the Europeans and Japanese captured the market to sell TV sets to consumers.
Further research:
The case studies discussed in this paper illustrate several successful efforts by the FCC to promote new entrants, e.g., commercial radio, cable deregulation, DBS entry. In Starr's formulation, "change would come … slowly," but, when the Commission makes the right call the results can be truly transformative.
However, these examples may not be sufficient to establish that the decade of the 1970s marks a decisive turning point in favor of promoting new entrants at the expense of incumbents. There are as many counter examples where the FCC favored new entrants before the 1970s, such as the decision to promote commercial radio in 1928, and Carterfone, decided in 1968. Other efforts by the FCC to promote competitive entry (e.g., video dialtone, open video systems) may not have been as successful. 168 Additionally, though not discussed here, policies that favor incumbents have also been adopted since the 1970's.
169
More research is needed in order to determine whether FCC decision-making falls into a pattern favoring incumbents or new entrants. 168 Daniel L. Brenner, "Creating Effective Broadband Network Regulation, Federal Communications Law Journal, Vol. 62, #1, at 13, 32-34 (2010) . 169 See e.g., Susan P. Crawford, "The Radio and the Internet," Berkeley Tech. L.J. 23, no. 2 (2008) at 933, 989 ("At the conclusion of the Commission's work during the summer of 2007 on the 700 MHz auctions, the FCC emerged from the brawl with negotiated arrangements that largely served incumbents' interests.").
